89 workers were injured on Dec 3
rd, 2012 when an oil rig at
Jurong Shipyard listed to one side. The injured victims were mainly from India
and Bangladesh. Men were seen throwing themselves into the sea from three
storeys up after a malfunction on the three-legged jackup rig caused the
platform to list by more than 10 degrees. Despite the massive structure failure, fortunately
there were no fatalities. Jurong Shipyard also managed to activate the
emergency response plan swiftly and all the workers were accounted for within
an hour.
(Jurong Oil Rig listed on Dec 3, 2012. It was upright on Jan 15, 2013, about one and a half month after the incident. The Straits Times, Jan 16, 2013)
The brakes on one of these three legs appeared to have given way. It
caused that side of the platform to slide downwards despite that just two days
earlier, the braking system had been subjected to a load test by applying 9,000
tonnes of weight on each leg. Altogether, the three legs are designed to bear
about 40,000 tonnes.
The oil rig accident was triggered by a failed braking system. Fail-safe
mechanisms would usually kick in to lock the jacking system. For this
particular case, the safety or back-up systems may be failed or were disabled
by someone. This could possibly happen if workers were doing repair work on
these back-up systems. “Jurong oil rig” was described as one of Singapore's
worst industrial accidents in recent times.
The jackup rig involved in the accident is the Friede & Goldman
(F&G) JU-3000N. Co-designed by Jurong Shipyard and naval architecture firm
F&G. When completed, the rig could operate in waters up to 120m deep and
could drill to depths of over 9,000m. It typically took three years to build
and cost about US$220 million (S$268million).
I used to share the Piper Alpha story when conducting naval platform
engineering seminars at one stage of my career. The major oil rig accident in
the world in terms of life lost and industry impact is the offshore oil
production platform Piper Alpha, which was located in the British sector of the
North Sea oil field and operated by Occidental Petroleum. At its peak, Piper
Alpha produced 300,000 barrels (48,000 cu.m) of oil a day, or a turnover of
about $30 million (US) a day by today’s standard. On July 6, 1988, Piper Alpha
engulfed in a catastrophic fire and caused the death of 165 men (out of 226) on
board the platform itself and 2 men on board a rescue vessel. Piper Alpha was
eventually lost in a sequence of structural failures. Over and above the tragic
loss of life, the financial damage was in excess of $3 billion (US).
(Piper Alpha. Photo source: www.arres.co.uk)
The investigation results revealed that the massive fire was not the
result of an unpredictable “act of God” but of an accumulation of errors and bad
decisions. Most of them were rooted in the organization, its structure,
procedures, and culture. Risk assessment (severity versus frequency) and ALARP
((minimise risk to) as low as reasonably practicable) were subsequently
introduced as part of the safety standards. The enquiry made 106
recommendations for changes to North Sea safety procedures, all of which were
accepted by industry.
The “Jurong oil rig” was reminiscent of another major industrial
accident that happened 34 years ago - The Spyros disaster. At about 2pm of 12
October 1978, Liberian-registered Greek oil tanker Spyros exploded at Jurong
shipyard, killing 76 people and injuring hundreds. It remains as Singapore's
worst accident in Singapore post-war history, in terms of lives lost. It is
also Singapore's worst industrial accident.
(Greek oil tanker Spyros exploded at Jurong shipyard. NAS 1978)
Spyros explosion occurred as about 150 workers, including women,
returned to the engine and boiler rooms of the ship after their lunch break. The
blast flung debris from the 35,600-tonne ship as far as 100 metres away and
started a flash fire that prevented dockside workers from rescuing those
trapped inside the ship. Due to the after-lunch timing, the number of
casualties increased dramatically, as many workers were returning to the repair
works. Many were burnt to death. Others suffered serious burns and inhalation
of toxic gases. One of the problems of the kin of the deceased was identifying
the bodies. Many bodies were charred beyond recognition. DNA profiling
technology in 1978 was not as what it is today.
(Injured victim rushed to hospital. NAS 1978)
(One of the problems of the kin of the deceased was identifying the bodies. NAS 1978)
An inquiry found that due to a common practice of local shipyards in
turning around ships under repair in the fastest possible time, safety
procedures especially for hot work (welding, gas cutting etc.) were generally ignored.
For Spyros, sparks from the cutting torch used during repairs, caused a fire
which ignited an explosive vapour mixture within the aft starboard fuel tank of
the vessel. The fuel tank had been contaminated by crude oil. The explosion
ruptured the common bulkhead between the tank and the engine room, releasing
the burning oil into the engine room and setting it on fire, killing the
workers there instantly.
Indeed during 1970s, safety practices in shipyards were not strongly
enforced. For Spyros case, a repair cutting tool might have caused the sparks
to ignite the vapour of the crude oil on the tanker. More safety regulations
were implemented after the disaster.
The district court findings placed the main blame on a hull fitter
whose hot work resulted in the ignition for the blast. Malaysian worker Lim
Hock Hoe was accused of using an oxyacetylene cutting torch near the aft
starboard bunker tank without any hot-work certificate. He was also accused of
applying heat to a part of the same tank before it was inspected and certified
to be free from any explosive or flammable substance and safe for the
application of heat. He was sentenced to six months’ jail for causing the death
of 76 people.
Subsequently, Lim Hock Hoe won his High Court appeal against the
conviction (The Straits Times, Feb 21, 1980). The Chief Justice, Mr Wee Chong
Jin, found there was no criminal liability on Lim’s part. However, Mr Wee told
him: “you have to live with the fact that it was your act which sparked off the
chain of events that day (Oct 12, 1978).”
As for the rest:
Jurong Shipyard was fined $20,000 and Jurong Shipyard Executive was fined
$30,000. (The Straits Times, March 20, 1979)
Shipyard's safety officer acquitted (The Straits Times, March 2, 1980)
I was a Singapore Polytechnic student at that time and joined many of
my friends to Singapore General Hospital to pay visits to the unknown injured
personnel. We met many general public at the hospital who were there to give courage
to the victims and their family members. I am quite certain that Singaporeans
were not branded as emotionless in that era. On the contrary, Singapore was a
caring society inherited from the Kampong spirit then. Somewhat 30 over years
later according to international pollster Gallup (2012), while Singapore has
developed into a first-world economy, Singapore is also the most emotionless
society in the world, beating the traditionally po-faced Georgia, Lithuania and
Russia in a survey of more than 150 nations.
(We met many unknown general public at SGH, giving courage to the victims and their family members. Singaporeans were not branded as emotionless in that era. NAS 1978)
Jurong Shipyard was absorbed under Sembcorp Marine in the later years.
34 years later, another major industrial incident happened again in the same
shipyard although it has changed owner. For Spyros incident in 1978, the
victims were mainly Singaporean. For the "Jurong oil rig" incident in
2012, the victims were mainly from India and Bangladesh who come to Singapore
to make a better life. It reflects major manpower landscape changes in the high
risk industry.
Note (10 November 2017):
According to The Straits Times November 10, 2017, Jurong shipyard was fined $400,000 over the "Jurong oil rig" incident by District Judge Adam Nakhoda on 9 November. The maximum punishment is a $500,000 fine.